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1. INTRODUCTION
The changes in the telecommunications sector in the last twenty years have 
primarily been initiated by means of new telecommunications regulatory 
provisions. Most of the EU Member States completely or partially privatized their 
national public telecommunications operators, thus forming the basis for the 
regulation of the open market during the nineties. These institutional changes 
may be perceived as the outcome of the accelerated development of technologies 
and of changes in user demand for telecom services, which have consequently 
brought about changes in the restructuring and reorganization of the competent 
authorities. This reorganization particularly implies the obligations related to the 
establishment of independent national regulatory authorities (NRAs). Upon the 
completion of the liberalization process, which was controlled and led by the 
European Commission, the economic focus of the telecommunications industry 
switched from the monopolistic to an open and regulated sector, with prices and 
quality of services being market regulated for the first time. 
As opposed to the model employed in the United States of America, where the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is in charge of the whole territory 
of the country in terms of telecommunications services and network regulation, 
a supranational institution with such competencies is simply non-existent in 
the European Union (EU). Regulatory activities in the EU are conducted within 
the framework of a complex relationship between numerous institutions. The 
rationale behind such an organizational structure lies firstly in the delegation 
principle, i.e. in the process of delegating telecommunications sector competencies 
to each of the Member States with the aim of closely monitoring the market 
behaviour of each of those Member States. The second relevant principle is the 
harmonization of legislation conducted by the European Commission though 
various agreements, decisions, recommendations and other provisions. These are 
later on implemented into national legislative systems, while the regulation of 
the market falls within the competencies of NRAs. This two-level regulation has 
contributed immensely to the close cooperation of all participants in the single 
European market.
The first directives legally regulating the issue of competition in the telecom 
sector were adopted during the nineties (European Union regulatory framework). 
These directives focused on raising the level of competition primarily through 
the possibility of providing telecommunication network access to alternative 
operators, as well as on the gradual elimination of barriers to entry. Such 
provisions should exist alongside general measures for safeguarding competition, Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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the focus of which is on the ex-post control in all economic industries. The ex-
post control implies collecting evidence in the case of an abuse of a dominant 
market position, as well as the adoption of adequate penalty measures. On the 
other hand, the sector-specific regulation allows for ex-ante control, which 
implies imposing obligations on all undertakings occupying a dominant position 
with the aim of preventing potential abuse of such a position. Competition itself 
can bring added value for end-users (Tintor, 2009) but in many cases additional 
regulation is needed. The following subsections illustrate the three stages of the 
EU telecom market regulatory framework, highlighting aspects of the analysis of 
relevant markets only.
2. THE 1998 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The 1998 EU regulatory framework comprised two types of directives, i.e. the 
liberalisation and harmonisation directives. The liberalisation directives were 
aimed at eliminating specific and exclusive rights previously granted to state-
owned telecommunications companies and at enabling the entry of other 
prospective operators. In line with these recommendations, national regulatory 
authorities were to be established in each Member State, with the aim of ensuring 
objective, non-discriminatory and transparent conditions for all operators. 
Harmonization directives secured the implementation of the EU telecom sector 
policy in all Member States.
With the aim of opening the monopolistic telecom sector to new market 
participants, the appropriate analysis had to be conducted in two stages. The first 
stage represented the identification of operators with the relevant service market 
share threshold of 25%. The geographical coverage area was the area for which 
an operator had been granted a licence (public fixed/mobile telecommunications 
network and public fixed/mobile telecommunications service). In the case where 
the market share was below 25% the independent regulatory authorities had 
to prove the potential strength of such an operator by employing additional 
criteria, such as the possibility of influencing conditions in the market, lack of 
countervailing buyer power, and easy or privileged access to capital markets/
financial resources; even though this was not very commonly employed in 
practice.
According to this regulatory framework, telecom market segments that were 
prone to ex-ante regulation were identified in appropriate directives. However, 110
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such market segments were not defined in accordance with the provisions of the 
Competition Law.
The following market segments were regulated within the ONP (open network 
provision) directives (Directive on interconnection, 1997): 
−  Fixed telephony (including infrastructure),
−  Mobile telephony,
−  Leased lines, 
− Interconnection. 
The regulatory remedies imposed on operators were the following: network 
access, the principle of non-discrimination, the publication of a reference 
interconnection offer (RIO), the principles of transparency and cost orientation, 
separate accounts, etc. A more detailed account of these and other remedies is 
given below. A graphical illustration of the previously explained principle of 
market analysis is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1.   Analysis of relevant markets according to  
the 1998 regulatory framework
3. THE 2002 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The main characteristics of the 2002 electronic communications regulatory package 
for sector-specific regulation are related to the simplification and harmonisation 
of legislative provisions, the principle of technological neutrality, the extension 
of rights for the European Commission vis-à-vis independent regulatory 
authorities, and the Competition Law as a basis for protection and promotion 
of investments and innovations within the telecom sector. The new directives 
within this regulatory package were drafted as a response to the convergence 
of technologies and services in the sector of electronic communications. The Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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main directives securing market regulation are the Framework Directive, Access 
Directive, Directive on Universal Service and Authorization Directive (European 
Union regulatory framework).
Since the previous regulatory framework can be characterized as promoting a 
certain rigid outlook, with decisions adopted solely on the basis of one criterion, 
in the 2002 regulatory framework the market share and the designation of 
operators with significant market power (SMP operator) are reached on the basis 
of several criteria. Furthermore, given the accelerated technological development 
in this sector, the need for more precise definitions of relevant markets meant 
an increase in the number of markets. Consequently, the number of potential 
regulatory remedies that could be imposed on dominant operators increased as 
well. Regulatory authorities were presented with the possibility of choosing the 
provisions best suited for the level of market competition and market regulation 
issues identified. This new regulative package provided the European Commission 
with a substantial extension of rights (veto rights), in case the regulatory 
authority’s designation of SMP operators and imposition of regulatory remedies 
had not been accounted for in detail. Furthermore, the transparency of work was 
significantly increased, with every stage of market analysis necessitating prior 
consultations. National regulatory authorities were entrusted with the task of 
encouraging the openness and competitiveness of the electronic communications 
networks, services and facilities within the EU, as well as fostering EU citizens’ 
interests (Directive on a common framework, 2002).
As regards relevant markets, the regulatory authorities intervene by imposing 
remedies on undertakings in cases where such markets lack effective competition 
due to the dominant status of the given undertakings in the market. The concept 
of domination is defined as a position of economic power, which, to a certain 
extent, enables an undertaking to act as an independent entity in relation to 
other competitors, clients, and finally, consumers (Commission guidelines, 
2002). To this effect, as opposed to the 1998 regulatory framework, the European 
Commission and the national regulatory authorities, in identifying markets 
susceptible to ex-ante regulation and assessing whether certain operators should 
be designated as SMP operators, resort to the principles and methodologies 
stipulated under the Competition Law.
The purpose of ex-ante remedies, imposed on undertakings designated as those 
having significant market power, is to ensure that these undertakings are not 
able to use their market power to limit or distort competition in the relevant 
market, or leverage such market power to neighbouring markets. The national 112
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regulatory authority makes an assessment of the effectiveness of the competition 
with regard to each of these relevant markets, which guarantees that there are 
no undertakings that alone or in cooperation with other undertakings, hold an 
individual or collective dominant position. 
The necessary stages in the process of market analysis may be divided roughly 
into the following four steps, graphically illustrated in Figure 2:
1.  Defining relevant markets.
2.  Analysis of defined markets.
3.  Identifying SMP operators.
4. Imposing measures and remedies with the aim of preventing monopolistic 
behaviour.
Figure 2. Process of relevant market analysis
The analysis, a painstaking process which may last up to a couple of years, 
necessitates expertise in collecting large volumes of data for the lawful and 
appropriate decision to be reached. Figure 3 illustrates the stages of this analysis 
in the case of the Austrian regulatory authority RTR (Köhler, 2008). Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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Figure 3. Market analysis in Austria according to 2002 framework
3.1. Defining relevant markets
The process of defining relevant markets is conducted in the first stage. The 
use of the term relevant market implies a description of products or services 
present in the market and an assessment of the geographical area of the market. 
Relevant markets defined according to the 1998 regulatory framework were 
different from the ones defined in accordance with the principles laid down 
under the Competition Law, since they were based on specific technological 
aspects of telecommunications, not on the demand and supply criteria which are 
primarily used in analysis within the scope of the Competition Law. The relevant 
service/product market comprises all products or services which are sufficiently 
interchangeable or substitutable, not only in terms of the objective characteristics 
(price and the intended use) owing to which these products or services are 
particularly suitable to cater for the increasing consumer needs, but also in terms 
of competitiveness and/or the structure of supply and demand in that market [5]. 
Products or services that are mutually interchangeable only to a small or relative 
degree do not represent a part of the same market. 
Demand-side substitution is used to measure the extent to which consumers 
are willing to substitute other services or products for the service or product 
in question, whereupon it is not necessary for all consumers to switch to the 
competitive product. Even the slightest switch to competitive products or services 
is sufficient for a relative price increase not to be considered cost-effective. 
Supply-side substitution indicates whether suppliers, other than those offering 
the products and services in question, would be willing to switch, immediately or 
in the short term, their line of production, or offer relevant products or services 
without incurring additional costs.114
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One of the possible ways of assessing the existence of any demand or supply-
side substitution is the application of the so-called ’hypothetical monopoly test’ 
(Commission guidelines, 2002). According to this test, a national regulatory 
authority should focus its attention on what would happen in the case of a small 
but significant, lasting increase (between 5 to 10%) in the price of a given product 
or service, provided that the prices of all other products and services remain 
unchanged. The responses given by consumers or undertakings concerned will 
facilitate the process of determining whether substitutable products actually do 
exist, and if so, where the boundaries of the relevant product market should be 
delineated. Since an increase in the price of a set of products would most likely 
lead to sales being lost, it is necessary to determine whether this loss would be 
sufficient to offset the increased profits that would otherwise be effected from 
sales made after the price increase. In the case where the price increase results in 
a profit loss, the indication is that consumers are able to find substitute products 
in the market which should be included within the framework of the relevant 
market (Figure 4). In general, the hypothetical monopoly test is relevant only 
with regard to products and services, the prices of which are freely determined 
and not subject to regulation.
Figure 4. Hypothetical Monopoly Test
National regulatory authorities may also take into account the likelihood that 
undertakings not currently active in the relevant product market may decide 
to enter the market within a reasonable time frame, following a relative price 
increase, i.e. a small but significant, lasting price increase. In circumstances 
where the overall costs of switching production to the product in question are 
relatively negligible, then that product may be incorporated into the product 
market definition. The fact that a rival company possesses some of the assets Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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required for the provision of the given service is irrelevant in the case where 
significant additional investment is needed in order for the services in question 
to be offered with profit.
The relevant geographic market comprises an area where the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of the relevant products 
or services, where the conditions of competition are similar or sufficiently 
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas where 
the prevailing conditions of competition are appreciably different (Commission 
guidelines, 2002).
Within the sector of electronic communications there are at least two main types 
of relevant markets to consider, those related to services provided to consumers 
(service markets) and those of access to facilities/infrastructure necessary for 
the provision of such services (access markets). Within these two broad market 
definitions, further market distinctions may be made depending on the demand 
and supply-side patterns. The European Commission has defined a total of 18 
relevant markets. Within these 18 markets, there are 7 retail markets. The 11 
remaining markets are wholesale, with 3 markets related to fixed interconnection 
(call origination, call termination and call transit) and 2 mobile network 
interconnection markets (call origination and call termination on the individual 
mobile network). The abovementioned markets are given in Table 1 below 
(Commission recommendation, 2003 and Buigues, 2004). Figure 5 illustrates the 
designation of relevant markets according to the two regulatory frameworks of 
1998 and 2002.
Figure 5. Transition from 1998 to 2003 directives.116
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Table 1. List of relevant markets according to the directives from 2003
Type of service No. Relevant market
RETAIL
Public fixed telephone 
network at fixed location
1.
Access to the public telephone network at a fixed 
location – residential customers 
2.
Access to the public telephone network at a fixed 
location - non-residential customers
3.
Publicly available local and/or national telephone 
services provided at a fixed location – residential 
customers
4.
Publicly available international telephone 
services provided at a fixed location – residential 
customers
5.
Publicly available local and/or national telephone 
services – non-residential customers
6.
Publicly available international telephone 
services – non-residential customers
Lines leased to end-users 7. Minimum set of leased lines
WHOLESALE
Interconnection between 
operators in fixed networks
8.
Call origination on the public fixed network at a 
fixed location
9.
Call termination on individual public telephone 
networks provided at a fixed location
10.
Transit services in the fixed public telephone 
network
Access to the public fixed 
telephone network 
11.
Wholesale unbundled access (including shared 
access) to metallic loops and sub-loop for the 
purpose of providing broadband and voice 
services
12. Wholesale broadband access
Lines leased to other 
operators
13. Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines
14. Wholesale trunk segments of leased lines
Voice service in the public 
mobile telephone networks
15.
Access and call origination on public mobile 
telephone networks
16.
Voice call termination on individual mobile 
networks
17.
Wholesale national market for international 
roaming on public mobile networks 
Broadcasting 18.
Broadcasting transmission services to deliver 
broadcast content to end-usersFramework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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However, it should be noted that national regulatory authorities are given the 
authority to identify additional markets, provided they are able to prove that such 
markets are relevant within the observed geographical area and analyse whether 
the abuse of the dominant position is present in such markets. In this way, the 
Commission has opened up new opportunities for the observance of specific 
market behaviours within individual Member States. 
3.2 Market analysis
At the beginning of the second stage, and with the aim of identifying the 
existence of ineffective competition, i.e. markets potentially susceptible to ex-
ante regulation, the analysis of the defined markets has to be conducted. To this 
end, the ‘three criteria test’ is employed:
1. The first criterion is the presence of high and non-transitory barriers to 
entry, which can be of an economic, legal or regulatory nature. An example 
of economic barriers are high sunk costs, legal barriers typically pertain to 
patents and licenses, whereas technical barriers refer to scarce resources such 
as frequencies and numbering. Moreover, there are structural barriers to entry 
that may, for example, result from the constant control of infrastructure that 
is not easily duplicated, or economies of scale and scope. Even where the 
barriers to entry are sufficiently high, an undertaking more efficient than the 
incumbent is unlikely to enter the market and ensure competition to the benefit 
of end-users without the intervention of a regulatory authority. The existence 
of high barriers to entry is therefore considered to be an initial indicator of 
the necessity of intervention on behalf of the regulatory authority aiming at 
ensuring the development of the competitive market. 
2. The second criterion pertains to market structures that do not tend towards 
effective competition in a relevant time horizon. Given the structure of the 
electronic communications market, in order for the regulatory remedies to be 
justified market structures should be analysed in a dynamic as well as a static 
manner. Sunk costs may represent a serious barrier to entry. These costs pertain 
to costs necessary for market entry that cannot be remunerated following 
market exits, such as investment in networks. The main issue is whether 
the market, in the absence of regulatory remedies, tends towards effective 
competition. Market dynamics may gradually eliminate barriers to entry, as is 
the case with technological developments. The merger of previously different 
markets may boost competition, or it may simply happen that, regardless of 
regulatory remedies, there is a sufficient number of active market participants 
for effective competition. In analysing whether market structures may or may 118
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not justify ex-ante regulation, one should also take into account the possibility 
that a market may tend towards effective competition regardless of barriers to 
entry.
3. The third criterion pertains to the question of whether the application of the 
Competition Law alone adequately addresses market failure (in the absence 
of  ex-ante regulation), taking into account the specific characteristics of 
the telecommunications market. Ex-ante regulatory remedies (relevant for 
telecommunication networks and services) should be imposed in cases where 
legislative measures stipulated under the Competition Law are not sufficient. 
Ex-ante  regulation and the Competition Law represent complementary 
instruments for achieving goals within the telecom sector stipulated by each 
policy respectively, as well as for resolving the absence of effective competition. 
With the purpose of identifying the telecom market in need of ex-ante regulation, 
all three of these criteria should be fulfilled cumulatively.
3.3. SMP analysis
The third stage of the analysis consists of identifying the level of competition, 
the existence of SMP operators and barriers to effective competition. However, 
prior to adopting conclusions pertinent to the existence of significant market 
power, a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the economic characteristics 
of the given market should be conducted. To this end, the dominant position 
of an operator is determined by means of numerous criteria designed for the 
assessment of the power of an undertaking. In applying these criteria, the 
current state of the market is no longer considered a reliable indicator; yet, future 
market movements in terms of the development of new technologies, potential 
competition, etc., must be taken into account as well. Consequently, the market 
share does not represent a sufficient indicator for assessing the dominant position 
of the operator. Furthermore, the common practice of the European Commission 
suggests that an SMP operator’s market share usually exceeds 40%. However, as 
opposed to the previous regulatory framework, this framework does not suggest 
any strict guidelines, for in some cases an operator may hold a dominant position 
regardless of low market share rates. The criteria for the assessment of dominance 
include the following (Commission guidelines, 2002):
•	 Market	share,	
•	 Overall	size	of	an	undertaking,
•	 Control	of	infrastructure	not	easily	duplicated,
•	 Technological	advantages	and	superiority,Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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•	 Absence	of	or	low	countervailing	buying	power,
•	 Easy	or	privileged	access	to	capital	markets/financial	resources,
•	 Product/services	diversification	(e.g.	bundled	products	or	services),
•	 Economies	of	scale,
•	 Economies	of	scope,
•	 Vertical	integration,
•	 A	highly	developed	distribution	and	sales	network,
•	 Absence	of	potential	competition,
•	 Barriers	to	expansion.
Not all of these criteria need to be fulfilled for an operator to be considered 
dominant. The dominant position may result from any combination of these 
criteria, even if these criteria alone do not suggest the significant market power 
of an operator. Since these criteria are not relevant for every market per se, a 
different set of criteria is applied to each individual market.
3.4 Adoption of measures for market regulation
The last stage pertains to the adoption of the best measure or combination of 
measures for the regulation of the relevant market. The obligations stipulated in the 
Directive on Access are the following (European Union regulatory framework): 
transparency (Article 9), non-discrimination (Article 10), accounting separation 
(Article 11), obligations of access to, and use of, specific network facilities (Article 
12) and price control and cost accounting obligations (Article 13). Apart from 
this, according to Article 8 of the Directive on Access, NRAs may impose 
additional measures. In order to do so, NRAs are obligated to seek approval from 
the Commission, whereas the Commission shall pass a decision to impose such 
measures following consultation with the Communications Bureau with regard 
to the issuance of approval for the NRA in question. The obligations stipulated 
in the Directive on Universal Service include the following: regulatory controls 
on retail services (Article 17), regulatory controls on the minimum set of leased 
lines (Article 18 and Annex VII) and carrier selection and carrier pre-selection 
(Article 19). 
Obligations imposed on SMP operators should be justified and directed towards 
the removal of a specific problem that has been previously identified. General 
measures and measures pertaining to all operators equally should be avoided. 
Measures to be imposed may be divided into two sets. 120
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1. The first set of measures pertains to the wholesale level and includes the 
following: 
a.  Transparency – a measure related to the right of access and/or interconnection 
which is imposed by means of the publication of reference interconnection 
offers (RIOs) and reference unbundling offers (RUOs) which include the 
official publication of prices. 
b. Non-discrimination – a measure related to the right of access and/
or interconnection imposed by means of the provision of access to 
infrastructure under equal conditions for SMP subsidiaries as well as for 
other alternative operators.
c. Accounting separation – a measure related to the right of access and/or 
interconnection which is imposed by NRAs in the form of a specific format 
of accounting methodology to be used for different telecommunications 
services to prevent unfair cross-subsidy.
d. Access obligations – a measure by which an NRA puts an SMP operator 
under obligation to provide access to its own network, as well as to its 
network facilities and equipment (power supply, collocation of equipment, 
etc.)
e.  Price control – a measure undertaken by an NRA in order to prevent an 
SMP operator setting prices that are either exceedingly high or low instead 
of cost-oriented prices.
2. The second set of measures is related to the retail level and includes the 
following: 
a. Price control for telecommunications services – this measure includes 
the setting of the highest limit of the retail price, the implementation of a 
specified system for cost accounting, etc. As such, this measure is considered 
to be strict and is applied only in cases when none of the previous measures 
is deemed effective.
b. Lease of lines – with the application of this measure an NRA defines the 
minimum set of leased lines that an SMP operator must offer to other 
operators. 
The second set of measures is employed only when the first set of measures is 
deemed not sufficient and effective. Carrier pre-selection, as one of the additional 
measures pertinent to fixed networks only, is to be undertaken following the 
implementation of the first set of measures and prior to the implementation of 
the second set of measures. 
However, the process of market analysis is not completed with the designation of 
regulatory measures. In the case where an NRA intends to take a measure that Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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could significantly affect the relevant market, it should provide the interested 
parties with the possibility of commenting on the draft measure in question. 
To this end, an NRA is obligated to hold public consultations on its proposed 
draft measure. Where the draft measure concerns a decision relating to an SMP 
designation or non-designation it should include the following:
•	 The	 market	 definition	 used	 and	 reasons	 thereof,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	
information that is confidential in accordance with the European and national 
laws on business confidentiality, 
•	 Evidence	related	to	the	finding	of	dominance,	with	the	exception	of	information	
that is confidential in accordance with the European and national laws on 
business confidentiality together with the identification of any undertakings 
proposed for SMP designation,
•	 Full	details	of	the	sector-specific	obligations	that	the	NRA	proposes	to	impose,	
maintain, modify or withdraw in regard to the abovementioned undertakings, 
together with an assessment of the proportionality of the proposed measure. 
4. THE 2007 REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The 2007 regulatory framework implemented reform by eliminating 11 relevant 
markets from the list. Since the two remaining markets were unified, 7 relevant 
markets were left for regulation. This simplification enabled a significant reduction 
of the regulatory burden for operators. Some of the retail markets were fully 
deregulated, with standard obligations relating to the protection of competition 
still being imposed. Out of the total of 7 markets, 6 markets are wholesale and 
only one market is retail (Commission recommendation, 2007):
1. Retail level: Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location for 
residential and non-residential customers,
2.  Wholesale level: Call origination on the public telephone network provided at 
a fixed location,
3. Wholesale level: Call termination on individual public telephone networks 
provided at a fixed location,
4.  Wholesale (physical) network infrastructure access (including shared or fully 
unbundled access) at a fixed location,
5.  Wholesale broadband access,
6.  Wholesale terminating segments of leased lines, irrespective of the technology 
used to provide leased or dedicated capacity,
7.  Wholesale level: Voice call termination on individual mobile networks.122
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The transformation related to the number of relevant markets and their mutual 
relationship between the two regulatory frameworks in given in Table 2.
Table 2. Transition from 2003 to 2007 directives.
Number Relevant market Regulation Number Relevant market Regulation 03 07 03 07
1.
1
Access to the public 
telephone network at a 
fixed location – residential 
customers 
Ex-ante 
regulation
10.
Transit services in the 
fixed public telephone 
network
No 
regulation
2.
Access to the public 
telephone network at 
a fixed location - non-
residential customers
11. 4 Wholesale unbundled 
access (including shared 
access) to metallic loops 
and sub-loop for the 
purpose of providing 
broadband and voice 
services
Ex-ante 
regulation
3. Publicly available local 
and/or national telephone 
services provided at a 
fixed location – residential 
customers
No 
regulation
12. 5
Wholesale broadband 
access
4. Publicly available 
international telephone 
services provided at a 
fixed location – residential 
customers
13. 6
Wholesale terminating 
segments of leased lines
5. Publicly available local 
and/or national telephone 
services – non-residential 
customers
14.
Wholesale trunk 
segments of leased lines
No 
regulation 6. Publicly available 
international telephone 
services – non-residential 
customers
15. Access and call 
origination on public 
mobile telephone 
networks
7.
Minimum set of leased 
lines
Ex-post 
regulation
16. 7 Voice call termination 
on individual mobile 
networks
Ex-ante 
regulation
8. 2
Call origination on the 
public fixed network at a 
fixed location
Ex-ante 
regulation
17. Wholesale national 
market for international 
roaming on public 
mobile networks 
EU 
roaming 
regulation
9. 3 Call termination on 
individual public 
telephone networks 
provided at a fixed 
location
18.
Broadcasting 
transmission services 
to deliver broadcast 
content to end-users
Ex-post 
regulationFramework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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Each regulatory authority is given the freedom to also analyse other markets 
(within the 18 markets previously mentioned or even outside these markets) in 
line with its national context, or to analyse the potential existence of a relevant 
transnational market. Furthermore, it is recommended that sector-specific 
national provisions related to the activity of monitoring the market should be 
based on the 2007 regulatory framework. Each regulatory authority is obligated 
to cooperate with the competent competition authority and provide notification 
on the results of its analyses.
5. THE DRAWBACKS OF MARKET ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO EU DIRECTIvES
Given the fact that Competition Law theory often cites examples from the telecom 
sector, telecom market analysis represents one of the challenging topics within 
the framework of competition protection. The telecommunications industry 
falls within the concept of natural monopolies, even though the wording of EU 
directives aims at diminishing the meaning of this concept through the emerging 
regulatory principle of technological neutrality which enables the introduction of 
other alternative operators into the relevant market. Such an endeavour basically 
means that the traditionally monopolistic sector is nowadays represented as a 
highly competitive one. Yet, certain drawbacks in market analysis based on EU 
directives still remain (Baudrier, 2006; de Streel, 2005; Hocepied, 2005; Dobbs, 
2004).
One of the issues still open for discussion is the final list of relevant markets 
within the electronic communications sector. Recommendations dating back to 
2003 recognized 18 national markets that NRAs should analyse. Additionally, 
NRAs have the freedom of adding any other relevant market that has not been 
adequately regulated. The first implementation of these directives in 2005 resulted 
in a total of at least 450 analyses of relevant national markets within EU borders 
for 25 Member States. On the other hand the Commission was obligated to 
provide comments and adopt or reject the results of the abovementioned analyses. 
With the implementation of the new 2007 regulatory framework, the number of 
relevant market analyses decreased to 189 within EU borders. The illustration 
of market analyses according to the 2003 and 2007 directives is given in the 
Appendix to this paper. Some authors suggest that out of the total of 7 markets, 
only two should be considered relevant (market 1 and 4) (Knieps, 2009). Given 
the fact that within the territory of Europe there is a significant concentration of 
operators active in numerous states, it is almost paradoxical that a transnational 
relevant market has not yet been identified. Consequently, in the coming years, 124
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we may expect the list of relevant markets to decrease on the national level and a 
new market to emerge on a transnational level. 
A remark that partially relates to the previous one concerns the question of 
deregulation. With the introduction of directives aimed at the liberalisation of 
the European telecom market, the process of deregulation emerged as one of the 
primary aims. However, previous and current directives have not fulfilled that aim. 
Market analysis, which is undertaken in several steps, necessitates the collection 
of data from a large number of market participants, which, in turn, represents 
a heavy burden for both the operators in terms of updating comprehensive 
databases, and the regulators in terms of assessment and the need for conducting 
in-depth economic analyses. However, we are all aware of the consequences of the 
economic crisis that emerged in late 2008, the cause of which is considered to be 
the insufficient regulation of financial institutions. Accordingly, deregulation is a 
necessary, although not invariably a sufficient, prerequisite for effective business 
activities. From this point of view, the rejection of the full deregulation of this 
sector seems justified. Even though full deregulation is unlikely to occur, the 
regulatory framework should be developed in such a way as to strike a balance 
between a level of sector control sufficient for effective competition on the one 
hand, and a relatively low level of regulatory burden for operators doing business 
on the other. 
There is also the question of the purpose of the analysis of markets which 
emerged in a competitive environment. In the beginning, the analysis was related 
only to the infrastructure built during the monopolistic regime. However, with 
market development and the development of competition, the analysis spread 
to other markets as well. Nowadays, for instance, a particularly interesting topic 
is the optical networks regulation within markets 4 and 5 (Draft Commission 
recommendation). However, the basic parameters to be taken into consideration 
when deciding on potential dominance are the possibility of reduplication of 
infrastructure (natural monopoly) and the existence of sunk costs. Hence, the 
regulation of access to telecommunications ducts where optical cables are placed 
is necessary, providing there is a reasonable doubt that alternative infrastructure 
is likely to be built.
On the other hand, operators often object to excessive freedom vested in regulators 
during the adoption of measures to be imposed on SMP operators. Along with 
the new package of directives, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC) has been established with the task of assessing the 
results of analyses in cooperation with the Commission. With the aim of ensuring Framework of EU Telecom Market Regulation
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transparency of the analysis and several levels at which certain decisions may be 
susceptible to modification, competition authorities, competent ministries and 
other European institutions have also been included in the process. The main 
drawback of such an approach is the question of the possible overlap of certain 
competencies as well as the unnecessary complication of the whole process. On 
the other hand, for an industry prone to sudden changes in high technology and 
the constant development of services, the rules should not be too rigid, or it may 
result in the regulation being obsolete in comparison with the market. Therefore, 
based on expertise, experience and in-depth analyses, the regulator must have 
the freedom to adopt the measures that are the most appropriate in any given 
situation. In other words, the regulator must reach its decision independently, 
provided that it has sufficient technological and personnel capacity competent to 
adopt the decision in line with best practices. 
Independent regulatory authorities are bestowed with the task of protecting 
competition, not competitors. However, another question arises: should the 
regulator eliminate barriers to entry or should it primarily focus on the prevention 
of abuse of the dominant position? In other words, should the regulator zero in 
on the protection of competition or should it promote new investments? These 
two questions, although related, arise from the fact that European directives 
emphasize the protection of alternative operators from incumbent operators. An 
approach where such protection would represent just one of the elements for the 
removal of barriers to entry would most certainly be a more proactive approach 
for boosting competition. 
The protection of competition within the telecom sector has traditionally been 
related to infrastructure. Monopoly within this market segment has been 
eliminated by means of access obligations imposed at different levels. But is this 
enough? Should the concept of regulatory activities reflect a long-term strategy 
for alternative operators that would be based solely on leased infrastructure, or 
should operators be encouraged to build their own infrastructure? European 
directives focus primarily on access obligations. Of course, even though the 
process of building new infrastructure is not banned, granting state subsides 
for building new infrastructure is prohibited. Every NRA should follow a basic 
pattern: ensure competitive prices for the lease of infrastructure in the short-
term, and in the long run encourage the building of new infrastructure. The 
directives have not yet defined this pattern with any precision. 
The current regulatory framework has had a positive impact on the electronic 
communications market in terms of safeguarding competition, which has in 126
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turn secured the further development of this sector. On the other hand, future 
obligation entails an additional effort aimed at adapting the regulatory policy to 
new challenges. 
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Markets 2007 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Markets 2003 1 2 8 9 11 12 13 16 3 4 5 6 7 10 14 15 18
Austria 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 3 3
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
Czech Rep. 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
Denmark 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Estonia 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Finland 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
1 1 2
France 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Germany 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 1
Greece 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Ireland 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
Italy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
1
Latvia 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 - -
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Malta 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Netherlands 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
Norway 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Poland 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Portugal 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Romania 1 1 1 1 - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Slovakia 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
Slovenia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
Spain 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2
Sweden 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
Switzerland
UK 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
Data updated on August 2, 2010. Source: Cullen International.
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